Mediation
Mediation is assistance to two or more interacting parties by a third party, who has no authority to dictate an agreement (Kressel & Pruitt, 1985) or who has the authority but chooses not to use it (Conlon, Carnevale, & Murnighan, 1994) . Typically, the disputing parties request or permit mediation, and the third party agrees to assist; or at times, the community dictates that mediation will take place. Once mediation is under way, the mediator utilizes a wide variety of techniques, which are applied to the disputants, to the disputants' relationship, or to the disputants' interactions with others (Wall & Lynn, 1993) .
Mediation-with its three parties and multiple techniques-has been applied worldwide to a variety of conflicts. Specifically, there is evidence of its use in China (Cohen, 1966) , Korea (Kim, Wall, Sohn, & Kim, 1993) , Malaysia (Provencher, 1968) , Poland (Olszanska, Olszanki, & Wozniak, 1993) , Azerbai (Keller, 1991) , Israel (Abu-Nimer, 1996) , Norway (Polley, 1988) , Japan (Cortazzi, 1990) , and the United States (Wissler, 2004) . Within each country, mediation is applied somewhat differently because culture, as well as many other social factors, determines which technique mediators will employ.
Because it has two distinct cultural groups-Kurds and western TurksTurkey provides an excellent venue for investigating the effects of culture on mediation. In the present study we do so, beginning with a concise overview of Turkey and then a description of two of its primary populations. Subsequently, we utilize a cultural effects model to develop and test hypotheses as to how these groups mediate.
Turkey
Contemporary Turkey was founded in 1923 out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, which lasted approximately 500 years. The modern state, with its 70 million inhabitants, has adopted Western norms and democratic institutions. The construction of a national identity has been a challenging process since the beginning of the republic because of the distinct populations that the country has inherited from its Ottoman past. In the east, the Kurds are tribal-based, belonging to groups that claim a common historical ancestor. In most of their villages, the tribe owns a common land, or a few families own most of the arable land, while the remainder of the land is divided into small plots that are fit only for subsistence agriculture. Villagers who do not own land work as agricultural laborers or herders for the large landlords. The poverty of most villagers forces them to enter into dependent economic, political, and social relations with the wealthier landlords (Cagaptay, 2006) .
In the western part of Turkey, which is unlike the traditionally isolated villages of the east, villagers have been exposed to urban influences for several generations. Agriculture tends to be specialized and is generally undertaken in association with fishing or lumber production, and economic links with market towns historically have been very important. Although the extended family plays a role throughout a villager's life, economic considerations also shape social relations (Pierce, 1964) .
Both the eastern and western residents have access to the courts for dispute resolution. However, the courts are expensive, time-consuming, and, to some extent, distrusted. As our Turkish co-author notes, the legal system also creates uncertainty, which Turkish residents wish to avoid. Turkish citizens score high on uncertainty avoidance (Kozan & Ilter, 1994) , are uncomfortable with ambiguity, wish to avoid risk taking, and feel more comfortable with consensus building as well as open discussion of issues. Therefore, they prefer to utilize mediators rather than to face the costs, risk, and uncertainty of courts.
Mediators
The parties who are called upon for their mediation services typically are elder males with high status in the community. Imams-leaders of the local mosque who are chosen by the members or who are appointed by the statemay be consulted. A second and primary candidate is the village muhtar, who is an elected elder male who holds his office for an extended period of time. The muhtar has a wide range of low-level, semi-official duties, such as keeping census records for the village, providing documentation for residents seeking national identity cards or driver's licenses, and assisting in minor problems with government bureaucracies.
The owners of coffeehouses/teahouses are also utilized on occasion because these houses are the primary village gathering places for males. Most males in the village know the coffee shop/tea shop owner, and the ownership of the primary social gathering spot conveys high status on its proprietor. Other senior village males (e.g., successful businessmen, landowners, teachers, doctors, village council members) can also be requested to mediate.
Prior to a discussion of the differences in western versus eastern mediations, we must point out that the selection of imams, muhtars, coffeehouse owners, teachers, landowners, and so forth-rather than tribal leaders or senior family members-has implications for the techniques that the mediators employ. Because the selected mediators do not possess a significant amount of formal power, they cannot mediate forcefully, demanding concessions from the disputants, strongly advising them on how to behave, or threatening them. Rather, they must rely on less assertive mediation approaches, and these differ in western versus eastern mediations. To explain and predict these differences, we must consider culture and its effects.
Culture: A Delineation
Taking his lead from Herkovits (1955) , Triandis (1994) delineated culture as a two-part process in which subjective cultural elements-namely, habits, customs, self-definitions, norms, attitudes, beliefs, roles, social structures, and values-determine social behavior. This definition is represented dynamically in the top section of Figure 1 . Here, it is indicated that the cultural paradigm has two distinct parts-subjective cultural elements and social behavior. A succinct example helps to enhance this distinction: Crow Native Americans held the belief (a subjective element) that a name change would strengthen a child when the child became weak. Therefore (see Figure 1 , Arrow 1), when a young girl seemed lethargic, one of her grandfathers changed her name (social behavior; Linderman, 1932) .
We have been rather precise in delineating the cultural paradigm because it underpins our theory building. As indicated in the cultural effects model (Zarankin & Wall, 2007) , both elements in the culture paradigm-subjective cultural elements and social behavior-can affect mediation behavior. The prediction that subjective cultural elements will affect mediation behavior ( Figure 1 , Arrow 2) is based on the attitude (e.g., Kraus, 1995 ), motivation (e.g., McClelland, 1961 , norm (e.g., Bond & Smith, 1996; Kiesler & Kiesler, 1969) , and values (e.g., Meglino & Ravlin, 1998) literatures, which indicate that these factors affect individuals' behaviors in a wide variety of settings. For example, the norm of alcohol avoidance (a subjective cultural element) can be expected to affect mediation behavior. Mediators who believe in abstinence will not relax their disputants with alcoholic drinks, as do their Korean counterparts (Kim et al., 1993 ), nor will they cap an agreement with "reconciliation wine."
Turning to the effect of the second factor in the culture paradigm (i.e., social behavior), its influence on mediation (Figure 1 , Arrow 3) is explained by consistency theory (e.g., Allgeier, Byrne, Brooks, & Revnes, 1979; Cialdini, 1988; Newcomb, 1953) . This theory holds that individuals value consistency and will-knowingly or not-maintain consistency in their behaviors, even across different contexts. For example, when speaking, the Japanese are often vague in their communications, allowing the listener to draw conclusions (Gibney, 1985) . Therefore, a Japanese mediator who is handling a dispute about a neighbor's barking dog will ambiguously comment "You have such a nice dog. It is so energetic," instead of specifically stating "Your dog is disturbing your neighbors, so let's see how this problem can be resolved."
Cultural Determinants of Eastern Versus Western Mediations in Turkey
Applying the cultural effects model to eastern and western mediation in Turkey, we find culture has an effect via the impact of two subjective cultural elements ( Figure 1 , Arrow 2): collectivism and social structure. Collectivists are strongly oriented toward their own in-group and consider that their group's goals are more important than or overlap strongly with their own. They value security, obedience to the group, in-group harmony, personalized relationships, and success of the group (Triandis, 1994) .
Research has indicated that, in general, Turkey is a collectivistic society (Schwartz, 1994) in which people are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups that perceive that conflict is harmful and should be avoided. The Kurds, of the eastern sector, with their blood ties and patriarchal traditions are significantly more collectivistic than are their western colleagues. Therefore, they have a very high concern for the group, believe strongly that harmony is important, and feel a major obligation to assist the group by facilitating harmony.
The Kurds also have a tribal-oriented social structure. Admittedly, this is related to their collectivism, but it is to be considered a distinct cultural factor because a population can be collectivistic but not tribal (as are many Chinese), or tribal but not collectivistic (as are the southern African Nharos; Guenther, 1996) . For the Kurds, the tribal orientation makes conflict costly. If it occurs within a family (or tribe), a dispute weakens valuable ties. Moreover, when it occurs between families or tribes, it can quickly split the community and escalate to violence and a blood feud. Given its potentialand highly probable-costs, conflict is considered a major detriment to the entire community and must be resolved.
Because their community is collectivistic and tribal-structured, Kurd mediators-as their community members-have a high concern for their group members, believe harmony is important, understand that conflict is deleterious to the community, and realize that the entire community has a stake in conflict resolution. Yet, as noted earlier, these mediators find themselves without formal power. In this must-settle, low-power situation, we predict that the Kurd mediators will follow a tandem strategy. The Kurd mediators will (a) stress the importance of the group; and (b) utilize third parties who are affected or interested in the dispute/mediation.
When pursuing the first facet of the strategy, Kurd mediators inform the disputants that peace and harmony are important. Therefore, they are morally obligated to resolve the conflict. Disputants will also be told that they themselves are interdependent and that their dispute has costs to third parties. In addition, the Kurd mediators will employ techniques to seal the agreement and bind the disputants together. These sealing/bonding techniques will take the form of an apology and a capstone, such as a handshake, a kiss on the cheek, or a reconciliation banquet.
Because western Turkish mediators operate in communities that are less collectivistic and are not tribally structured, they will use these approaches less frequently. Stating the conclusions more specifically, we propose the following:
Hypothesis 1. Kurd mediators will cite moral principles for resolving the dispute more often than will western Turkish mediators.
Hypothesis 2. Kurd mediators will cite disputant dependence on each other more frequently than will western Turkish mediators.
Hypothesis 3. Kurd mediators will note the cost of the dispute to third parties more frequently than will western Turkish mediators.
Hypothesis 4. Kurd mediators will call for apologies more often than will western Turkish mediators.
Hypothesis 5. Kurd mediators will have capstone procedures or events at the end of the mediation more often than will western Turkish mediators.
The second prong of the Kurd mediators' strategy entails drawing on the community-family members, businesspeople, friends, elders, village council members, and so forth-for support and aid in resolving the dispute. Kurd mediators can do so because the community members believe harmony is important, understand conflict is damaging to the community, and have a stake in the resolution of the conflict. The Kurds' use of community members will include bringing third parties to the mediation, allowing them to advise or educate the disputants on how they shall behave and permitting the third parties to suggest concessions. And we predict that Kurd mediators will rely on third-party assistance; for example, collections of money from the community to pay the blood price to a murder victim's family. Because western Turkish mediators handle disputes in communities that are not tribally structured and that are less collectivistic, we predict that they will use fewer of these techniques.
Hypothesis 6. Kurd mediators will meet with third parties present more often than will western Turkish mediators.
Hypothesis 7. Kurd mediators will gather information from third parties more frequently than will western Turkish mediators.
Hypothesis 8. Kurd mediators will have third parties educate/ advise the disputants more often than will western Turkish mediators.
Hypothesis 9. Kurd mediators will have the third parties argue for concessions more frequently than will western Turkish mediators.
Hypothesis 10. Kurd mediators will have third parties provide assistance to the disputants more frequently than will western Turkish mediators.
Imam Mediations
As noted earlier, disputants from both the eastern and western sectors of Turkey have a number of individuals they can turn to as mediators. One of these is the imam, the leader of the mosque.
Of the Turkish population, 99% is of the Islamic faith (Oktem, 2002) . The Arabic word Islam means submission, which derives from a word meaning peace and a life focused on peace, mercy, and forgiveness. In other words, Islam means the act of committing oneself completely to Allah, a commitment in faith, conformity, and trust to the one and only Allah. All of these elements are implied in the name of this religion, which is described in the Koran or the book of Islam. When a Muslim has a problem that can be solved by referring to the Holy Koran, he or she may look to the Koran for guidance or may consult an imam, the mosque leader.
These religious leaders, we predict, will mediate differently from their secular counterparts. This prediction is underpinned by the earlier argument that culture affects mediation via the effects of the social behavior (see Figure 1 , Arrow 3). With regard to this behavior, it can be reasoned that imams, in their day-to-day interactions with village members, ask people to meet with them in the mosque, provide guidance to them by reading or quoting the Koran, and by praying with them. Utilizing consistency theory (e.g., Allgeier et al., 1979; Cialdini, 1988; Newcomb, 1953) , we can deduce that the imams would be likely to engage in these same behaviors (i.e., more frequently than secular mediators) when asked to mediate disputes.
This deduction is also supported by role theory (Biddle, 1986) . According to this theory, individual behavior is dictated, in part, by the person's role in society. Over a period of time-long or short-members of society observe role occupants and develop expectations as to how these occupants behave, or should behave. These expectations are communicated to the role occupant, who receives them and, to some extent, complies. Subsequently, the role occupants not only behave in accordance with these expectations; they also come to believe that the expected (and exhibited) behavior is correct. Therefore, they engage in it across various contexts.
Applying role theory to the imams, it can be argued that imams have frequently met with people at the mosque, provided guidance to them from the Koran, and have prayed with them. Therefore, societal members expect imams to behave in this manner. They tacitly and overtly communicate these expectations to the imams, who understand these expectations, behave accordingly and accept these as appropriate imam role behaviors. Therefore, when asked to mediate disputes, the imams are apt to engage in imam role behavior by meeting with disputants at the mosque, providing guidance from the Koran, and praying with them. Because other mediators (e.g., muhtars, landowners, teachers) do not have such role expectations placed upon them, they are less apt to engage in these behaviors.
Hypothesis 11. In their mediations, imams will take disputants to a mosque more frequently than will secular mediators.
Hypothesis 12. Imams will provide guidance from the Koran and other religious texts more frequently than will secular mediators.
Hypothesis 13. Imams will pray with the disputants more frequently than will secular mediators.
Method

Participants
The study participants were 105 community mediators from the western and eastern sectors of Turkey. The western mediators resided in villages around Bursa, Izmit, and Istanbul, while the eastern/Kurd mediators lived in the villages around Erzurum and Diyarbakir. Our preference and plan were to collect an equal number of interviews from the West and the East. However, the difficulty and expense of collecting data in the Kurd villages allowed/forced us to conduct only 38 interviews in the eastern sector. In the western sector, 67 interviews were conducted.
Procedure
The interviewer, who was fluent in the local dialect, entered the villages, randomly selected residents, and asked them to whom people turned for the mediation of their disputes. Having obtained this information, the interviewer sought out each mediator and informed him (all but 1 were males) that he was conducting a study on the manner in which conflicts were handled in Turkey. He then conducted a structured interview asking each respondent to recall the last dispute that had been brought to him. Subsequently, the interviewer asked each mediator to note the nature and context of the dispute, as well as the persons involved in it. Then the mediators were asked to recall the specific measures they took to assist in or resolve the dispute and to describe the agreement or lack of agreement. All of the mediators' responses were recorded in Turkish and were later translated into English.
Two U.S. raters-who had previously coded over 1,000 mediations in various other countries-read the mediators' reports of the steps taken to resolve each dispute (when doing so, they were blind as to subculture from which the mediation came). These raters independently coded each step/ technique reported by the mediators, utilizing the categories listed in Table 1 . (Each mediator technique was coded or placed into only one category. That is, a technique was not given multiple codes.) When differences occurred, the raters conferred and arrived at mutually acceptable classifications for these techniques. The classification system was a modification of the one supplied by Pruitt that had been developed, refined, and implemented by his teams while studying U.S. community mediation (e.g., Pruitt, McGillicuddy, Welton, & Fry, 1989) . This system has also been utilized in studying mediations in various other countries (e.g., Callister & Wall, 2004; Kim et al., 1993; Wall & Blum, 1991; Wall & Callister, 1999) . Mediator brings additional third parties to a meeting.
Have third party educate
Mediator has a third party to educate, persuade, or advise one or both disputants on how they "should" think or act. Have third party argue for concessions
Mediator has a third party present to argue for or propose a specific concession or agreement point.
Have third party criticize
Mediator has a third party criticize a disputant's person, attitude, or behavior. Have third party assist Mediator offers a third party's assistance or gets this assistance for the disputants or the mediator.
Design and Analysis
The study entailed two levels of ethnic groups (western vs. eastern) and two levels of mediator type (imam vs. secular), with the technique (see Table 1 ) frequencies serving as the dependent variables. An ANOVA was used for the tests of Hypotheses 1 through 5 and Hypotheses 11 through 13, while a MANOVA was used to test Hypotheses 6 through 10.
The Disputes
To some readers, many of the mediated disputes (see Table 2 ) may seem to deserve time in court, while other disputes may appear to be rather One interesting, as well as prevalent, dispute in both the western and eastern Turkish sectors is elopement. In many societies, this practice is acceptable, and in the United States, it even has some romantic overtones. In Turkey, this is less the case. Elopement represents a financial loss to the woman's family because it denies the family a bridal price and dishonors them. Because of these setbacks, the woman's family frequently disputes the elopement, claims that an abduction took place, and demands restitution from the man's family. (Sometimes, the woman's family considers killing the couple in order to cleanse the family's honor.) As compensation, cash or another woman can be offered to settle the dispute, and the nature and amount of the compensation depend upon the statuses of the two families, the level of violence in the elopement, the history of conflict between the families, and the status of the eloped woman (if she is to be the first or second wife).
An equally intriguing dispute is murder. Often it is felt that a murdered person's soul cannot rest in peace until his or her blood has been cleansed with the perpetrator's blood or that from the perpetrator's close family member (Rainsford, 2006) . Sending the killer to jail is not sufficient. The victim's family seeks its own justice, which requires a death or blood money, and the choice between the two can be negotiated, as can the amount of the blood money.
The Mediators
In the Procedure section, we indicated that our interviewer entered the villages, randomly selected residents, and asked them who was utilized for mediation in the village. Usually, a mediator was identified after 3 or 4 residents were questioned. Subsequently, the interviewer sought out this mediator and requested an interview. (A mediator did not have to be mentioned by multiple residents.) We were somewhat surprised by the variety of mediators. There were approximately 50 muhtars, 17 landowners, 13 imams, 5 coffeehouse owners, 4 (unlabeled) respected elders, 4 teachers, 3 businessmen, 2 village council members, 2 tribal leaders, 1 doctor, and 1 veterinarian. We use the term approximately because some mediators had dual membership. For example, a muhtar could also be a coffeehouse owner; likewise, a landowner could also be a village council member.
The Mediations
As noted earlier, two experienced U.S. raters read the reports of the mediation steps taken to resolve each dispute. Then, they independently scored the mediation techniques, using the categories outlined in Table 1 . The coders' interrater reliability was 91%; that is, they scored 1,223 techniques and their classifications were identical for 1,117 of these, prior to consultations to resolve the discrepancies.
Results
Turning to our hypotheses concerning the differences in the western Kurd/eastern mediations, we find that the data support Hypothesis 1 (see Table 3 ). Specifically, Kurdish mediators (M = 1.18) cited moral principles more often than did their western Turkish counterparts (M = 0.36), F(1, 103) = 21.01, p < .001, with the most often cited moral principle being the need for peace.
As for Hypothesis 2, which held that Kurds would more frequently cite the disputants' dependence on each other, the direction of the difference between the means is as predicted (Kurds, M = 0.47; western Turks, M = 0.28), but is not significant. The data reveal that the Kurdish mediators strongly preferred a different tack. Instead of stressing that the conflict was damaging the relationship between the disputants themselves, they emphasized that the conflict was deleterious to others, such as family members, villagers, and society. As predicted in Hypothesis 3, the Kurds utilized this technique-that is, cost to others-more frequently (M = 0.71) than did the western Turkish mediators (M = 0.24), F(1, 103) = 10.29, p < .002.
As predicted in Hypothesis 4, the Kurds also utilized apologies more frequently (M = 0.58) than did the western Turkish mediators (M = 0.19), F(1, 103) = 5.16, p < .03. As predicted in Hypothesis 5, their agreements were more often ratified with capstone rituals, such as handshakes, cheek kisses, and banquets (Kurds, M = 0.86; western Turkish mediators, M = 0.34), F(1, 103) = 9.92, p < .002.
In Hypotheses 6 through 10, we predicted that the Kurd mediators would rally third parties to assist in the mediations. Specifically, the Kurd mediators would more often meet with third parties present, gather information from them, rely on third parties to advise the disputants, have them to argue for concessions, and have them provide assistance to the disputants.
Since the five techniques in these hypotheses involve the utilization of third parties, we first tested the hypotheses with a MANOVA. This proved to be significant, multivariate F(4, 100) = 7.09, p < .001. As Table 3 indicates, this significance can be attributed mainly to the differential utilization of the techniques: third-party attendance at the mediation meetings, third-party advice, and third-party assistance. Specifically, as Table 3 indicates, the Kurd mediators-as predicted in Hypothesis 6-more often had third parties present at the meetings with the disputants (M = 1.08) than did the western Turkish mediators (M = 0.30), F(1, 103) = 22.11, p < .001. The Kurd mediators did not gather more information from third parties (Hypothesis 7), but they did more frequently have third parties advise/educate the disputants (Hypothesis 8; Kurd mediators, M = 0.13; western Turkish mediators, M = 0.01), F(1, 103) = 4.64, p < .03. The data do not support the prediction (Hypothesis 9) that the Kurd mediators more frequently had the third parties argue for disputant concessions. Yet, the results strongly support Hypothesis 10, that the Kurd mediators (M = 0.37) more frequently relied on third-party assistance than did the western Turkish mediators (M = 0.09), F(1, 103) = 7.99, p < .005, such as contributions of blood feud payment or a goat to be sacrificed and eaten at the reconciliation feast. In sum, the data indicate that the Kurd mediators mustered the community forces to assist in the mediation, and they used them in an assertive, but nonaggressive manner. That is, they had the third parties attend, advise and assist. Yet, the Kurd mediators did not have them dictate concessions.
As noted earlier, the interview procedure was to enter a village, inquire of the residents who frequently mediates disputes in the village, seek out this person, and interview him. Instead of going to the mosques and interviewing the imams, we followed this approach because we did not know if imams frequently mediate community disputes.
Our procedure reveals one of the joys of field research: discovering that a factor under study is more complex than assumed, and finding that its complexity contributes to our knowledge. In Hypothesis 11 through 13, we predicted differences between imam and secular mediations, but our interviews revealed a third mediation category-an imam-secular hybrid-one in which the team assembled by the secular mediator included an imam (n = 11). Moreover, the imam, when on the mediation team, was permitted to utilize his chosen techniques (e.g., having a disputant walk under the Koran) in the mediation.
The imams' inclusion on the secular mediators' team required a modification of our intended design and analysis. Instead of utilizing only imams and secular mediators in the comparisons, we included an additional level: one in which the imam was a member of the secular mediator's team. Subsequently, we tested the original hypotheses and then the differences across all three levels. As Table 4 indicates, the data support (the original) Hypotheses 11 through 13; namely, the imams (M = 0.54) used meeting in a mosque more frequently than did secular mediators (M = 0.00), F(1, 92) = 92.49, p < .001. The same was true for reliance on the Koran and other religious references (imams, M = 1.08; secular mediators, M = 0.10), F(1, 92) = 48.98, p < .001; and prayer (imams, M = 0.15; secular mediators, M = 0.01), F(1, 92) = 7.70, p < .007.
In addition, tests across the three levels clearly indicate the effect of religion. When an imam was included on the mediation team (see Table 4 ), the mediation approaches (except for prayer) included more religiously oriented techniques than when the mediator was purely secular, but fewer than when the mediator was solely an imam for meeting in a mosque, F(2, 102) = 34.25, p < .001; use of the Koran, F(2, 102) = 24.98, p < .001; and prayer, F(2, 102) = 4.46, p < .01. In closing the report on the imams, we note that their use of prayer is low (M = 0.15), but it is consistent with the results from our former study in Malaysia (Wall & Callister, 1999) , wherein we found the average use of prayer by 52 imam mediators was only 0.17.
Discussion
The contributions of this study are threefold. First, it is the first empirically based report of community mediation in Turkey. Second, it is the first to compare the approaches of western and eastern mediators within that country. And third, it utilizes a two-part cultural model containing subjective cultural elements and social behavior to predict a difference in their mediations.
With regard to the western and eastern mediations, we found (see Table 3 ) that both sets of mediators relied rather equally on the techniques of gathering information, meeting separately, arguing for concessions, and putting disputants together. But there was differential utilization for many of the techniques; namely, for moral principles, meeting with a third party present, capstone, criticizing, educating, citing dependence, having a third party assist, having a mediator assist, written agreement, and apology. The differential use for most of these techniques (e.g., moral principles, third-party techniques) was discussed in the hypothesis development. In the interest of thoroughness and precision, the remainder (i.e., mediator assistance, written agreement, apology) deserve some additional discussion. A close reading of the transcripts indicates that the mediator-assist technique was used less frequently by the Kurd mediators because they preferred to rely on third-party assistance, rather than give the assistance themselves.
Turning to the written agreements, their absence in the Kurd mediations is also explained by a reliance on third parties. When an agreement is made in the presence of third parties, no written document is necessary because the witnesses' presence and observation formalize the deal. This finding and reasoning are consistent with our data from India (Wall, Arunachalam, & Callister, 2008) , which reveal that mediators who had third parties present relied less often on written agreements than did mediators whose mediations were not observed by third parties.
The use of apology also merits some additional discussion. We found that Kurd mediators more frequently obtained apologies in order to mend the relationship between the disputants. The apology in this (Muslim) culture is sought and is effective because a disputant's apology gives the opponent pride and dignity in being able to offer forgiveness (Fattah, 2006) . By way of contrast, mediators in a Buddhist culture use apologies because apologizing allows disputants to gain an inner calm (the mainstay of this life and the next), and enhances the disputants' karma and outcomes in another life (Goddard, 1932; McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000) . Apology also benefits the opponent, because he or she is no longer held accountable.
Shifting from the western-eastern mediations to those of the imams, we found the imams, as predicted, utilized meetings in the mosque, relied on the Koran or religious texts, and prayed more frequently than did their secular counterparts. These findings indicate that mediators tend to behave consistently from one setting to another; that is, from day-to-day activities to mediations.
However, prayer was not extensively employed by the imams. At first blush, the low averages for praying-in Turkey (M = 0.15) as well as in Malaysia, a Muslim society (M = 0.17)-may seem inconsistent with consistency and role theory, which support the prediction that social behavior in a culture will determine the mediators' behavior (see Figure 1 , Arrow 3). Imams do pray in their daily interactions with people; therefore, it would be consistent for them to pray in mediations. Praying is also an expected behavior in the imam role. Thereby, imams might be predicted to abide by this role expectation when mediating. And because they pray on a daily basis, the imams believe that this behavior has value; therefore, it can be predicted that they would pray in mediations.
These theories and predictions notwithstanding, imams do not pray frequently in mediations because the Muslim custom (or norm), unlike that of Christians and Jews, is to refrain from praying for divine intervention or guidance. Muslims, our Turkish coauthor notes, are more apt to say "Allah is great," or "If Allah is willing," and then engage in behaviors, assuming that Allah will intervene if He wishes to do so.
This last finding-that imams pray infrequently in mediations, but rather frequently in their daily lives-dovetails serendipitously with a contrast that we have noted recently in Philippine and U.S. mediations (Tabucanon, Wall, & Yan, 2008) . In the Philippines, community mediators are typically Catholics who pray daily at home, with their families, and at Mass. Quite frequently, they carry this behavior into the mediation, opening the first session with a prayer to God asking the Holy Spirit for guidance. When asked why they do so, they express the belief that some divine guidance will be helpful in the mediation.
In the United States, many of the mediators are also devout Catholics, who-like their Philippine counterparts-pray at home, with their families, and at Mass. Yet, none pray in mediations. When asked why they do not pray here, their general response is that religion should be kept out of legal affairs. That is, they have a norm that praying should not be interjected into mediations.
The Philippine-U.S. contrast, as well as the imams' mediations, suggests a refinement in the cultural effects model; namely, that subjective cultural elements not only affect social behavior (see Figure 2 , Arrow 1) and mediator behavior (see Figure 2 , Arrow 2), but they can also moderate (see Figure 2 , Arrow 4) the effect of social behavior on mediation. For instance, in the U.S. example, the Catholic mediators have a belief or norm (i.e., subjective cultural element) that they should pray in their daily lives, and, as a result (Arrow 1), they do so (i.e., social behavior). They also are influenced by a norm of separation of church and state (i.e., subjective cultural element). Therefore (Arrow 4), they do not allow prayer (i.e., social behavior) to determine mediation behavior.
Our Philippine and U.S. studies suggest not only a moderating effect of subjective cultural elements in the cultural effects model; they also indicate that another element (i.e., mediation institutions) should be added to the model. In the Philippines, mediators work in three-person panels (i.e., Pangkat), which were instituted by Ferdinand Marcos in 1978. Because of this institution, the approaches of Philippine mediators are quite different from those of U.S. mediators, who typically mediate singularly.
Our observations of the three-member Pangkat panels in the Philippines; five-member teams in India; four-member, extrajudicial system for the resolution of collective labor conflict in Andalusia (SERCLA) mediation panels in Spain (Martinez-Pecino, Lourdes, & Euwema, 2006); street-committee mediators in China; ketua kampungs in Malaysia; National Center for Mediation and Conflict Resolution in Israel (see www.justice.gov.il/ MOJHeb/Gishor/odot/); as well as the community mediation centers and mediation corporations in the U.S. motivate us to consider it a distinct element. We are also inclined to include this element because these institutions are increasing in number and variety as mediations become more prevalent, formalized, and complex around the world.
When we include the mediation institutions in the model (see Figure 2) , we find that they affect the other elements and can moderate the effects of the various elements. Consider a few examples. The Philippine Pangkat mediation institution affect mediator behavior (see Figure 2 forbidding attorneys to attend the mediations (Tabucanon et al., 2008) . Because attorneys are absent, the mediators tend to be quite assertive in their mediations. With regard to the effect of mediation institutions on social behaviors (see Figure 2 , Arrow 7), we find a butcher's establishment of a "peace mission" mediation service in Diyarbakir, Turkey, has the effect of reducing family vendettas (Rainsford, 2006) . Finally, and unfortunately, it seems that the five-man (it is usually all males) mediation teams in India enhance the belief that women are inferior members of society (see Figure 2 , Arrow 5). While additional examples can establish the validity of the other links in the model, we will terminate the discussion at this point, but encourage scholars to utilize the model as a guide for future theorizing.
In closing, we note that our primary goal in this study was to compare western and eastern mediations in Turkey. From a broader perspective, our study indicates that mediation is very much subject to situational influences, one of these being culture. Therefore, practices that are utilized in one context will not be employed in another; that is, one size does not fit all.
For example, mediators in the U.S. and other Western countries frequently attempt to remain neutral, protect the confidentiality of the disputants and refrain from pressuring them. While such an approach might prove effective for Western disputes (currently, there is some debate here), it would be an alien, ineffective approach for Kurdish mediators. Kurdish mediators prefer to emphasize the importance of peace and harmony, to share the dispute with third parties, and to use third parties to press toward agreements. It is hoped that our study and this broader perspective have contributed to a better understanding of community mediation in Turkey, as well as in other countries.
